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Abstract— In this study, we examine software safety risk in the 
early design phase of the NASA Constellation spaceflight 
program.  Obtaining an accurate, program-wide picture of 
software safety risk is difficult across multiple, independently-
developing systems.  We leverage one source of safety 
information, hazard analysis, to provide NASA quality 
assurance managers with information regarding the ongoing 
state of software safety across the program.  The goal of this 
research is two-fold: 1) to quantify the relative importance of 
software with respect to system safety; and 2) to quantify the 
level of risk presented by software in the hazard analysis.   
     We examined 154 hazard reports created during the 
preliminary design phase of three major flight hardware 
systems within the Constellation program.  To quantify the 
importance of software, we collected metrics based on the 
number of software-related causes and controls of hazardous 
conditions.  To quantify the level of risk presented by software, 
we created a metric scheme to measure the specificity of these 
software causes. 
     We found that from 49-70% of hazardous conditions in the 
three systems could be caused by software or software was 
involved in the prevention of the hazardous condition.  We also 
found that 12-17% of the 2013 hazard causes involved 
software, and that 23-29% of all causes had a software control.  
Furthermore, 10-12% of all controls were software-based.  
There is potential for inaccuracy in these counts, however, as 
software causes are not consistently scoped, and the presence 
of software in a cause or control is not always clear.  The 
application of our software specificity metrics also identified 
risks in the hazard reporting process.  In particular, we found 
a number of traceability risks in the hazard reports may 
impede verification of software and system safety. 
Keywords-Constellation program; hazard reports; 
measurement; safety; empirical software engineering 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Development of large complex systems in the aerospace, 
defense, energy and travel industries requires constant 
attention to safety risks.  A safety risk is a risk whose effect 
can be injury or the loss of life either directly or through a 
chain of events.  The task of controlling safety risk is further 
complicated when developing complex systems due to the 
amount of planning, assessment and communication required 
to manage multiple projects.  The issue of controlling 
software safety risk has become a leading area of concern in 
systems development as many traditionally hardware-centric 
systems become more reliant on software.   
     In this paper, we examine issues of measuring 
software safety in one such system – the multi-year, multi-
billion dollar Constellation spaceflight program at NASA.   
Software plays a significant role in many Constellation 
systems.  Analysis, planning, and mitigation of safety risks 
pervade every phase of development.  The multitude of 
systems that comprise the Constellation program are 
developed by contracting organizations using a form of 
concurrent engineering [5] wherein multiple development 
activities (i.e. design, implementation, testing) occur in 
parallel.  For NASA quality assurance managers, obtaining 
an accurate, program-wide picture of software safety risk is 
difficult across these multiple, independently-developing 
systems for a number of reasons:   
 
 There are many development groups, each with their 
own reporting style for safety risks.  Even though 
program-wide standards exist, each group has their own 
interpretation of how to address those standards. 
 The NASA panel charged with overseeing system safety 
has limited resources and technical knowledge to fully 
understand all the implications of software safety. 
Although these experts have significant experience 
managing the mostly non-software development of 
rockets and spacecraft at NASA, applying the NASA 
safety process to software is relatively new.  
 The safety engineers responsible for the systems 
sometimes have limited understanding of how to 
describe software safety risk to meet the requirements of 
NASA safety reviews. 
 The rules for recording software risk in the safety 
tracking systems were only recently developed, resulting 
in no clear delineation between software-based risks and 
non-software-based risks. 
 
NASA Safety Reliability and Quality Assurance 
personnel (SR&QA) have undertaken a number of initiatives 
to address these challenges.  As part of these initiatives, we 
have participated in the development of a software safety 
measurement program to provide a program-wide overview 
of software safety risk.  The goal of our study was to 
leverage one source of safety information, hazard analysis, to 
provide NASA quality assurance managers with information 
on the ongoing state of software safety.  We collected data to 
demonstrate the increased role of software as a control 
mechanism for safety risks, suggesting that increased 
emphasis on software safety analysis is warranted.  The 
software safety metrics also yielded new guidelines for 
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safety engineers to use when describing software safety 
risks. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In 
Section II we describe the research context and provide an 
overview of the hazard analysis process on the Constellation 
program.  In Section III we describe the measures we capture 
on software risk described in hazard reports. In Section IV 
we present the data findings of this study and in Section V 
we discuss these results and a several risks uncovered in the 
software safety reporting process.  Finally, in Section VI we 
give our conclusions on how such measures can best be used 
in this environment.   
II. RESEARCH CONTEXT 
The Constellation program is a complex system of 
systems (see Figure 1 for the Constellation program 
hierarchy).  Each system contains multiple elements, each 
with numerous, complex hardware and software subsystems.  
Our research focuses on the hazard analysis of three projects 
(A, B, C), one at the system level and two at the element 
level. The names of the projects are kept anonymous for 
confidentiality purposes. The scale and complexity of the 
Constellation program presents many challenges to NASA 
personnel in assessing the state of system safety and, in 
particular, software safety. 
A. The safety review process in the Constellation program  
Systems development is overseen by NASA and follows 
a government acquisition V-model where individual system 
development is performed by multiple contract companies.  
The multiple Constellation systems are being developed in 
parallel over a period of several years.  The development 
groups use various databases for coordinating information 
among the groups.  These include databases containing 
project requirements, safety hazards, defects, designs and 
other project management information.   
At various times, checkpoint meetings are held by the 
Constellation Safety & Engineering Review Panel (CSERP), 
which acts as gatekeeper for development milestones.  There 
are several milestones in the development process (e.g. 
system requirements review, preliminary design review, 
critical design review) with different requirements for the 
type of system and software safety analysis that must be 
performed.  At each milestone, the development groups 
identify safety risks in system operation and design and 
create strategies (controls) for mitigating those risks.  The 
CSERP reviews the risks and the operational or design 
strategies for mitigating these risks.  The CSERP panel then 
approves the current design or requests changes to provide 
for better risk mitigation.  As development progresses and 
the system matures, the analyses and designs become more 
specific and concrete.  The primary responsibility of the 
CSERP is to ensure that all safety risks which could result in 
loss of life, loss of the vehicle, or loss of mission are 
identified and handled properly. 
Analyzing and designing to mitigate software risk is 
supported by SR&QA personnel.  SR&QA is a division 
within the Constellation program that provides guidance to 
safety engineers on the specific projects and participates in 
CSERP safety reviews.  This division is comprised of NASA 
employees and contractors with expertise in hardware, 
software and mission assurance. 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Hazard analysis in the Constellation program 
Our study thus far focused on the hazard analysis 
methodology used in the program.  Hazard analysis is a top-
down approach to system safety analysis.  In the 
Constellation program, hazard analysis is complemented by 
other safety analysis methods, including failure modes and 
effects analysis (FMEA), fault-tree analysis (FTA), 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), quality audits, process 
and project metrics, and many more. 
Figure 1. Constellation program hierarchy (abbreviated example) 
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A hazard is any real or potential condition that can cause:  
injury, illness, or death to personnel; damage to or loss of a 
system, equipment, or property; or damage to the 
environment.  An example of a hazard might be “Avionics 
hardware failure leads to loss of mission.”  The hazard is 
accompanied by a list of systems, elements and subsystems 
that cause or are affected by the hazard, a detailed 
description of the hazardous condition, and information 
regarding the likelihood of the hazardous condition 
occurring. 
Hazards are described with several important properties: 
 Causes – The root or symptomatic reason for the 
occurrence of a hazardous condition; 
 Controls – An attribute of the design or operational 
constraint of the hardware/software that prevents a 
hazard or reduces the residual risk to an acceptable 
level; 
 Verifications – A method for assuring that the hazard 
control has been implemented and is adequate 
through test, analysis, inspection, simulation or 
demonstration. 
Figure 2 illustrates the conceptual organization of a 
hazard.  Each hazard (e.g., engine failure) has one or more 
causes (e.g., failure with fuel line, software turns off the 
engine, or physical failure of engine).  Each cause has one or 
more controls that reduces the likelihood that a cause will 
occur or mitigates the impact should the cause be realized 
(e.g., backup computers to account for software failures). 
Each control has one or more verifications (e.g. test, 
inspection, simulation or demonstration) to ensure that the 
control is appropriately implemented.  In the Constellation 
program, all hazards and their associated causes, controls and 
verifications are stored in a database called the Hazard 
Tracking System (HTS).  Each such hazard is stored as a 
Hazard Report (HR) in the HTS. 
 
 
Figure 2. Hazard structure 
Controls often represent new requirements for the 
system.  For example, if a buffer overflow causes a software 
component to overflow (e.g., the inertial guidance computer 
overflow in the Ariane 5 rocket failure in 1996 [1]), a 
possible control could be to monitor the values of the 
appropriate register and provide some mitigating action if it 
overflowed.  This would represent a new requirement that 
the developers would have to implement in the flight 
software. 
Causes and controls can also be transferred to another 
cause or control in a different hazard reports.  Transfers 
imply that the cause or control is fully described in the other 
hazard report.  For example, a structural collapse will impact 
nearly every system in a hazard.  Rather than list causes and 
controls for structural collapse in every hazard report, it is 
handled in its own report that is referred to by the other 
hazards.  During system implementation, all transferred 
causes and controls must be verified for a hazard reports to 
be considered “closed.”  Verifying transfers is a manual, 
labor intensive process and is at risk when transfer references 
are not kept up to date. 
It is important to note that, in this environment, software 
is never a hazard; hazards all represent physical events that 
may harm the mission.  Component failure (e.g., degraded 
thruster performance) or outside events (e.g., hitting space 
debris, impact of weather, cosmic ray impact) may impact a 
mission, but software itself is not a hazard.  However, 
software, as well as human error or component failure, can 
certainly cause a hazard (e.g., the software shutting a fuel 
valve at the incorrect time).  Therefore, the HTS describes 
physical events, some of which are caused by software and 
some of which are not. 
We define a software hazard as a hazard that contains 
one or more software causes.  A software-related hazard is a 
hazard where software is either one of the causes or software 
is in one or more of the controls.  We are interested in 
software-related hazards because, even though software may 
not be a direct cause of a hazard, software that is part of the 
control can be faulty and cause a subsequent hazard (e.g., 
Therac-25 radiation errors [4]).   Software hazards are a 
proper subset of the software-related hazards.  Both software 
hazards and software-related hazards may include hardware 
causes and controls as well. 
III. RESEARCH METHOD 
We examine the Constellation hazard reports to assess 
the state of software safety risk and provide feedback into the 
software safety process.  Our approach [3] is based on the 
premise that there is a relationship between the processes 
used during software development and the product's 
characteristics.  Not achieving the anticipated product 
characteristics (e.g. safe software) may be the result of not 
adhering to the process, or the process itself may be flawed.   
By analyzing the execution of the software safety process in 
the Constellation program, we hope to gain insight into 
whether appropriate software safety processes are being 
performed and performed appropriately.   
Process artifacts available during development can 
provide insight into process execution.  Hazard reports, 
produced throughout system development, are one artifact 
that can provide insight into the state of software safety and 
can be used to evaluate the software safety process.  We 
describe our goals for evaluating software safety risk using 
the Goals Questions Metrics (GQM) model [2]: 
Hazard 
Cause 
Cause 
Cause 
Control 
Control 
Control 
Control 
Control 
Control 
Control 
Verification 
Verification 
Verification 
Verification 
Verification 
Verification 
Verification 
1.  Analyze a sample of the hazards reported for 
Projects A, B and C in order to characterize them 
with respect to the prevalence of software in 
hazards, causes, and controls from the point of view 
of NASA quality assurance personnel in the context 
of the Constellation program. 
2.  Analyze the software causes in a sample set of 
hazard reports for Projects A, B and C in order to 
evaluate them with respect to the specificity of those 
software causes and hazards from the point of view 
of NASA quality assurance personnel in the context 
of the Constellation program.  
Specificity in hazard causes is important for 
understanding concrete, verifiable controls.  A lack of 
specificity in the definition of causes indicates a risk that the 
cause has not been adequately identified and evaluated so as 
to be controlled.  Each system we analyzed had 1-2 
“generic” software hazard reports, which describe only the 
procedures for how software should be developed, but do not 
describe specific design or behavior.  Often, software causes 
had a single control referring only to these “generic” reports 
rather than a specific design attribute. These controls 
represent risk in that there is no objective verification that a 
software cause has been controlled by adhering to the 
software process. 
An important note: our evaluation focuses on software 
safety risk.  Safety, in the Constellation program, does not 
include software security.  Software security on the 
Constellation program is handled a by separate organization 
charged with hardening the software systems against 
malicious attack and assisting in secure software design.  
A. Goal 1: Quantify the prevalence of software in hazards, 
causes and controls 
Goal 1 is useful to SR&QA personnel in understanding 
the risk analysis effort required to adequately control 
software risk and also to identify systems and subsystems 
that involved more software risk than others.  We first 
analyzed the hazard reports to classify causes of a hazard and 
controls for these causes as either software or non-software.  
These data can then be used to answer a number of questions 
(see below).  Tables I and II show the categories of causes. 
1. What percentage of the hazard causes are software 
causes? This is represented by entries B and C of Table 
I.  The percentage is given by (B+C)/(A+B+C+D). 
2. What percentage of the hazards is software–related? 
Does software play a role in either causing or 
mitigating a hazard? Those hazards are represented by 
the entries in boxes X, Y and Z of Table II. The 
percentage is given by (X+Y+Z)/(W+X+Y+Z).  
3. What percentage of hazard causes are non-software 
(e.g., hardware, operational error, procedural error) 
causes with software controls, i.e., Z in Table II? These 
are potentially “hidden” software risks.  For example, if 
software, as a control, is monitoring a condition, if the 
monitoring software fails, even though the hardware is 
functioning correctly, there is a risk that the monitor 
will fail to detect an actual subsequent problem or the 
software may send erroneous status messages.  Thus, 
the software can again be the cause of a hazardous 
condition. The percentage is given by D/(A+B+C+D). 
4. What percentage of non-software causes contains 
software controls?  D/(A+D) 
5. What percentage of the causes contains software 
controls? (C+D)/(A+B+C+D) 
6. What percentage of causes is transferred, i.e., another 
HR contains the control for this cause? Transferred 
causes can incur risk when traceability is not 
maintained. 
7. What percentage of controls is transferred?  Transferred 
controls also introduce traceability risks. 
8. What percentage of the non-transferred hazard controls 
is specific software controls, i.e. describe software 
behavior or design? This may be a simple measure of 
the number of software related requirements that deal 
with safety critical software.   
9. What percentage of non-transferred controls are 
references to “generic” software controls? 
TABLE I.  CAUSE CATEGORIES 
Cause Table Causes 
Controls 
 Non-software Software 
Non-software  (A) Non-software causes with no software controls (B) Software causes with no software controls. 
Software (D) Non-software causes with at least one software control 
(C) Software causes with at least one software 
control 
TABLE II.  HAZARD CATEGORIES 
Hazard Table Causes 
Controls 
 Non-software Software 
Non-software  (W) Hazards with no software causes or controls 
(X) Hazards with at least one software cause 
and no software controls 
Software 
(Z) Hazards with no software causes and at least one 
software control 
(Y) Hazards with at least one software cause 
and one software control 
B. Goal 2: Evaluate the specificity of software causes 
Goal 2 assists SR&QA personnel by identifying software 
hazards and software causes that require additional work on 
the part of the safety engineers.  Furthermore, hazard reports 
mature over time, and the evaluation of Goal 2 enables 
SR&QA personnel to track the maturation of software causes 
as the systems approach their quality milestones.  Goal 2 is 
in some respects a proxy for SR&QA and CSERP personnel, 
who must understand the origin of a hazardous condition (the 
cause) as described in the hazard reports.  Software causes 
are evaluated according to their specificity.   
As nearly all projects are in preliminary design, we focus 
on evaluating causes since only causes, which should be 
well-defined for a Phase I safety review prior to Preliminary 
Design Review (PDR).  Based on the preliminary analysis of 
software-related hazards, we have derived an initial set of 
software safety metrics that can be applied to hazard reports.  
These metrics were developed using feedback from SR&QA 
personnel and using existing hazard reports as examples.  
By PDR, the software is defined to the level of Computer 
Software Configuration Item (CSCI). We judge the minimal 
specificity of software causes based upon the existence of 
three attributes in the cause description: (1) which software 
component may fail its intended operation (origin), (2) what 
is the erroneous behavior for this software component 
(erratum), and (3) what impact does this erroneous behavior 
have on the system (impact)? We then define a metric to 
evaluate the specificity of a cause. 
CSCIs (e.g. Guidance Navigation & Control, Vehicle 
Management) are more specific than sub-systems (e.g. 
avionics, propulsion) and would represent Level 6 and below 
in Figure 1, enabling the analysis of more specific causes and 
corresponding controls.  Furthermore, CSCIs can be used in 
the analysis of relationships between components and 
specifying the safety-critical events, commands and data.  
Describing software causes at the CSCI level enables the 
hazard analyst to identify specific design elements that 
satisfy the requirement for controls.  
Software-related causes and sub-causes may be described 
in a single cause in a hazard report or they may appear as 
multiple separate causes.  From the software cause and sub-
cause metrics for a given hazard, an overall hazard rating for 
each hazard report for software causes can be created.  
1.  For each hazard report, what are the number and 
percentages of L1, L2 and L3 causes where L1, L2 and 
L3 are defined as:  
 L1: a specific software cause or sub-cause for a 
hazard, where a specific software cause must 
include all of the following: 
o Origin – the CSCI that fails to perform its 
operation correctly  
o Erratum – a description of the erroneous 
command, command sequence or failed 
operation of the CSCI 
o Impact – the effect of the erratum where failure 
to control results in the hazardous condition, 
and if known, the specific CSCI(s) or hardware 
subsystem(s) affected 
 L2: a partially-specified software cause or sub-
cause for a hazard, where a partially-specified 
software cause specifies one or two of the origin, 
erratum or receiver at the CSCI/hardware 
subsystem level. 
 L3: a generically defined software cause or sub-
cause for a hazard, where a generically-defined 
software cause does not specify the origin, erratum 
or receiver at the CSCI/hardware subsystem level. 
2.  For each system, what are the number and percentages 
of La, Lb, Lc, Ld and Le hazards where La-Le are 
defined as: 
 La: All software causes and sub-causes in a hazard 
are L1 
 Lb: all software causes and sub-causes in a hazard 
are L1 except for a single L3 
 Lc: Software causes and sub-causes are a mix of 
L1, L2 and L3 with at least one L1 
 Ld: All software causes and sub-causes are either 
L2 or L3 with at least one L2 
 Le: All software causes are L3 
 A low hazard rating (e.g., Ld and Le) may indicate there 
is a risk of not being able to mitigate the software risk 
associated with these hazards. A high rating (e.g., La and Lb) 
more likely indicates that the development team fully 
understands the risk and has addressed it appropriately.  The 
overall hazard ratings provide a top level view of the 
maturity of software cause specificity in a subsystem or 
mission element.   
 We note that these ratings do not measure the quality or 
the completeness of the software cause and control analysis; 
these ratings only reflect the specificity of the information 
captured in the hazard reports.  We believe that these ratings 
likely indicate risk where insufficient specificity has been 
provided to identify the software-based cause of a hazardous 
condition within the hazard report. Insufficient specificity 
probably indicates that the problem is not well understood, 
unless further details are included in supporting 
documentation.  However, unless such supporting 
information (and the necessary context and expertise to 
interpret it) are maintained with the hazard report, there is 
risk that information will be lost. 
C. Data sources and context 
A total of 154 hazard reports were analyzed for three 
Constellation systems: 77 in the Project A, 57 in the Project 
B, and 20 in Project C.  Project A is developed by NASA 
while Projects B and C are being developed by contractor 
organizations.  The three projects are developing large, flight 
hardware systems.  Software is a critical element in 
controlling the function of these systems, and the amount of 
software varies significantly in each project. 
Each project performed their hazard analyses according 
to Constellation program guidelines.  During the Preliminary 
Design Phase, the safety engineers for each project met with 
the CSERP to evaluate, discuss, and mature the hazard 
reports.  Additional description of the three elements is 
presented with the study findings below.  Our analysis 
includes all available hazard reports available from the 
Preliminary Design Phase of these systems with the 
exception of four hazard reports from Project A that were in 
an incomplete, preliminary state. 
D. Analysis procedure 
We first identified software and non-software causes and 
controls in the hazards reports.  An analysis of the text of 
each hazard report was performed manually as follows: 
1) Each cause from a hazard report was entered in a 
separate row of an Excel spreadsheet (see Table III). 
2) For each cause, each relevant control description was 
marked as either a software control (green), a non-
software control (blue), a control that transferred to 
another hazard report (orange), a transfer to another 
hazard report detailing exclusively with software 
(yellow), or controls with multiple sub-controls (grey).   
A control was determined to be a software control if it 
described the behavior or design of FCSW (flight 
computer software), FC (flight computer), specific 
CSCIs, or used the word “software.” 
a) Each control in the hazard report corresponds to a 
column in the spreadsheet.  
b) Some software controls contained enumerated “sub-
controls” that described separate software design 
and behavior.  The parent control was marked as 
grey, and the sub-controls were separately listed in 
the spreadsheet in the order of appearance in the 
hazard report.  These sub-controls were classified 
using the same scheme as in step 2. 
3) The cause description for each cause was read and was 
marked as either a software cause (green) or a non-
software cause (white). Causes for which all controls 
were transferred were marked red and excluded from 
further analysis under the assumption that the cause was 
controlled by the transferred hazard report(s).  A cause 
was determined to be a software cause when software, 
FCSW (flight computer software), FC (flight computer) 
or specific CSCIs were mentioned in the cause 
description. Table III provides an example of the cause-
control matrix for a hazard report. 
The classifications of causes and controls were then 
counted for each hazard report and recorded in a separate 
worksheet (see Table IV for an example).  These data were 
then used to compute summary statistics across all hazard 
reports and to answer the questions posed in Section 2.A.  
The “causes” column is the total number of causes listed in 
the hazard report, and the “active causes” column is the 
number of non-red causes in the cause-control matrix.   
Transferred controls were counted only when other non-
transferred controls existed for the same cause.  For example, 
Cause 6 in Table III was counted as having two controls 
since the transferred control appears with a non-transferred 
control, whereas Cause 4 was counted as having no controls.  
When transferred generic software controls (yellows) were 
counted, they were counted as software controls (e.g. Cause 
2 in Table III was counted as having three software controls). 
 
TABLE III.  CAUSE-CONTROL MATRIX EXAMPLE 
Hazard 
Report 
Cause 
Controls 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
HR1 1                                   
  2                                   
  3                                   
  4                                   
  5                                   
  6                                   
  7                                   
  8                                   
  9                                   
 
 
TABLE IV.   EXAMPLE TABULATION OF CAUSES AND CONTROLS 
Hazard 
Report Causes 
Active 
causes 
Software 
causes 
Non-SW causes 
with  SW controls Controls 
SW 
controls 
HR is SW 
related? 
HR1 9 5 4 1 12 4 TRUE 
HR2 14 10 0 6 33 7 TRUE 
  SW  Non-SW  transferred  Transferred to generic SW HR 
IV. FINDINGS 
These data were calculated for all of the hazard reports 
available for each element.  The team reviewed a total of 154 
hazard reports, 2013 causes, and 4916 controls.  Tables V-
VII are the results for Project A, Tables VIII-X are the 
results for Project B and Tables XI-XII are the results for 
Project C.  
TABLE V.  PROJECT A HAZARD TABLE 
 Non-software 
cause 
At least 1 software 
cause 
no software control W 39 51% X 0 0 
at least 1 software 
control 
Z 10 13% Y 28 36% 
Total 77 
TABLE VI.  PROJECT A CAUSE TABLE 
 Non-software cause Software cause 
no software control A 393 71% B 0 0% 
at least 1 software control D 76 14% C 85 15% 
Transferred causes  252  
Total  806  
TABLE VII.  PROJECT A CONTROL TABLE 
  
N % of 
total 
% of non-
transferred 
Non-software 1603 64% 82% 
Software 243 10% 12% 
Generic software controls 105 4% 5% 
Transferred controls 566 22% - 
Total 2517 100%   
TABLE VIII.  PROJECT B HAZARD TABLE 
  Non-software 
cause 
At least 1 software 
cause 
no software control W 19 33% X 0 0% 
at least 1 software 
control 
Z 1 2% Y 37 65% 
Total   57   
TABLE IX.  PROJECT B CAUSE TABLE 
  Non-software cause Software cause 
no software control A 398 77% B 0 0% 
at least 1 software control D 57 11% C 62 12% 
Transferred causes   155   
Total causes   672   
 
 
 
 
TABLE X.  PROJECT B CONTROL TABLE 
  N 
% of 
total 
% of non-
transferred 
Non-software 1799 75% 84% 
Software 298 12% 14% 
Generic software controls 37 2% 2% 
Transferred controls 265 11% - 
Total 2399 100%   
TABLE XI.  PROJECT C HAZARD TABLE 
  Non-software 
cause 
At least 1 software 
cause 
no software control W 6 30% X 0 0% 
at least 1 software 
control 
Z 0 0% Y 14 70% 
Total   20   
TABLE XII.  PROJECT C CAUSE TABLE 
  Non-software cause Software cause 
no software control A 275 81% B 0 0% 
at least 1 software control D 9 3% C 57 17% 
Transferred causes   194   
Total   535   
 
A. Metrics summary 
From these data, we calculate the metrics necessary to 
help answer the questions from Section III that help quantify 
the importance of software with respect to system safety (see 
Table XIII).  These data demonstrate that although a small 
percentage (12-17%) of hazard causes are software causes, 
the percentage of hazardous conditions that are either caused 
by software or are controlled by software in much higher 
(49-70%).  This indicates that software is a safety-critical 
aspect of the overall system and over half of all hazard 
reports are software-related.   
Note that while 49% of Project A’s hazard reports are 
software-related, 67% of Project B hazard reports and 70% 
of Project C hazards are software related.  This disparity can 
be a consequence of the characteristics of the three systems, 
an indication of how the three development organizations 
arrange the subjects of the hazard reports differently, or a 
combination of these.  The lack of a uniform structure for 
reporting software-related hazards inhibits a consistent, 
general methodology for software risk assessment based on 
the hazard reports.  In all three systems, the importance of 
software clearly demonstrates the need for a strong software 
development process with adequate control and verification. 
TABLE XIII.  SUMMARY METRICS QUANTIFYING THE IMPORTANCE OF SOFTWARE WITH RESPECT TO SYSTEM SAFETY 
 Question Project A Project B Project C 
1 What percentage of the hazard causes are software causes?   15% 12% 17% 
2 What percentage of the hazards is software-related? 49% 67% 70% 
3 What percentage of hazard causes are hardware causes with software controls?   14% 11% - 
4 What percentage of hardware causes has software controls? 16% 13% - 
5 What percentage of the causes has software controls? 29% 23% - 
6 What percentage of causes is transferred? 31% 23% 36% 
7 What percentage of controls is transferred? 22% 11% - 
8 What percentage of the non-transferred hazard controls are specific software controls? 12% 14%  
9 What percentage of the non-transferred hazard controls are references to “generic” software controls? 5% 2% - 
 
B. Software hazard and software cause specificity ratings 
To quantify the level of risk presented by software, we 
applied the software cause and software hazard metrics 
described in Section III to the causes in the hazard reports.  
The L-metrics are applied to software causes and hazards 
with at least one software cause only (Tables XIV-XVI).  
     Using the current software cause metric definitions, 
there are noticeable differences between elements.  Project A 
had a greater proportion of well-specified software causes 
than Projects B and C at the time of analysis.  Project B had 
a large portion of software-causes that could be considered 
“in work,” and thus one would expect the distribution to shift 
to the higher end of the scale as work progresses.  Project C, 
however, was non-specific in terms of software causes.  In 
general, the software causes in Project C had very specific 
descriptions of the impact of a software failure on the non-
software, but little was described in terms of what caused the 
software to malfunction or how the software error 
manifested beyond stating that “the software fails.” 
TABLE XIV.  PROJECT A SOFTWARE SPECIFICITY RATINGS 
Hazard ratings  Cause ratings 
La 5 18%  L1 65 50% 
Lb 7 25%  L2 26 20% 
Lc 7 25%  L3 38 29% 
Ld 3 11%     
Le 6 21%     
TABLE XV.  PROJECT B SOFTWARE SPECIFICITY RATINGS 
Hazard ratings  Cause ratings 
La 3 8%  L1 64 38% 
Lb 1 3%  L2 68 40% 
Lc 14 38%  L3 37 22% 
Ld 13 35%     
Le 6 16%     
TABLE XVI.  PROJECT C SOFTWARE SPECIFICITY RATINGS 
Hazard ratings  Cause ratings 
La 0 0%  L1 0 0% 
Lb 0 0%  L2 41 71% 
Lc 0 0%  L3 16 29% 
Ld 12 86%     
Le 2 14%     
 
Once again, we note that these ratings do not measure 
the quality or the completeness of the software cause and 
control analysis; these ratings only reflect the specificity of 
the information captured in the hazard reports.  We believe 
that what these ratings reflect may indicate risk where 
insufficient specificity has been provided to identify the 
software-based cause of a hazardous condition within the 
hazard report. Insufficient specificity may indicate that the 
problem is not well understood.   
V. RESULTS 
In Section III we presented our two GQM goals for this 
study. We describe our conclusions for each goal in Section 
V. A.  We describe and discuss a number of risks observed 
in the hazard reports and their implications for software 
safety in Section V.B.  
A. Conclusions of GQM evaluation 
 
GQM Goal 1: Analyze a sample of the hazards reported 
for projects A, B and C in order to characterize them with 
respect to the prevalence of software in hazards, causes, and 
controls from the point of view of NASA quality assurance 
personnel in the context of the Constellation program. 
It is clear from Section IV.A and Table XIII that software 
plays a significant role in the safety of the Constellation 
program.  However, there is variable precision in the 
counting of software hazards, causes and controls; the 
guidelines for reporting hazards are open to interpretation 
and each group reported and scoped hazards differently.  
Furthermore, the number of software and software-related 
hazards is likely greater than shown as there may have been 
software causes and controls that were not identified as such.  
From the point of view of the quality assurance 
personnel, it is difficult to track each hazard cause and 
control to its source, and overall traceability becomes more 
difficult. In Section B below, we present our lessons learned 
about the nature of software in hazard reports, which directly 
addresses the issue of traceability and proposes some 
modifications to the development process to take this into 
account. 
 
GQM Goal 2: Analyze the software causes in a sample 
set of hazard reports for projects A, B and C in order to 
evaluate them with respect to the specificity of those software 
causes and hazards from the point of view of NASA quality 
assurance personnel in the context of the Constellation 
program. 
Section IV.B and Tables XIV-XVI provide the summary 
data for this goal. For all 3 projects, the causes were rated at 
least Level L2 for 70-78% of all causes. However, project C 
had 0% with the highest rating of L1, whereas the other two 
projects had L1 ratings of 38% and 50%. Although this data 
is only from PDR, project C has significantly less specificity 
that the other two.  Part of the CSERP review process is to 
further refine the specificity of hazard reports over time, 
particularly in subsequent development phases.  These 
current figures provide an important baseline for CSERP and 
SR&QA personnel to monitor the progress of hazard report 
specificity over time. 
Because this data was collected during the time for PDR, 
the process used by the Constellation Program did not 
require that controls and verifications be fully developed. For 
this reason, we were unable to fully characterize controls and 
their verifications for this study and it will have to wait for a 
later time. 
B. Informing the software safety process: risks observed in 
software hazard reports 
In the process of developing this data, we have 
uncovered a number of potential risks for the program with 
regard to how software-related hazards are reported.  A lack 
of completeness and uniformity in the information describing 
software risk (i.e. software causes and controls) creates a risk 
in itself.  That is, software causes may not be thoroughly 
described and understood, and controls that involve software 
may be difficult to verify.   
 Maintaining traceability between causes, controls and 
verifications is essential for ensuring that all causes of 
hazardous conditions have a control in place and that this 
control has been verified.  Our analysis was conducted on 
hazard reports that had passed or were in the Phase I CSERP 
review where complete description of controls and 
verifications were not yet required.  However, traceability 
needs to be maintained between causes, controls and 
verifications during Phase I.  We observed a number of risks 
associated with incomplete traceability in the hazard reports. 
1)  Risk 1 – Lack of consistency in structuring hazard 
report content, causes and control descriptions impairs 
understanding.   
All hazard reports in the Constellation program follow a 
standard template, but the content of the hazard reports, 
cause descriptions, and control descriptions differed 
substantially between the three programs and between hazard 
report authors within the same program.  In some cases, the 
unstructured text creates risk that the CSERP may not be 
able to fully understand the risks detailed in the hazard even 
with supporting materials. 
During preliminary design, safety engineers are still 
developing first versions of hazard reports and becoming 
familiar with the expectations of CSERP and the 
requirements of the software safety process.    This risk has 
abated over time as CSERP and SR&QA personnel have 
worked closely with safety engineers to form a uniform 
expectation for hazard report content.  These experiences are 
also being used to recommend improvements to NASA 
process documentation and training materials. 
2) Risk 2 – Lack of consistent scope in causes and 
controls impairs risk assessment.  
Related to Risk 1, there is a lack of uniformity in scoping 
software causes and controls between programs or between 
hazard reports within programs in some cases.  A cause 
reading “Generic avionics failure or software flaw causes 
improper operation of control thruster” certainly involves 
software, but it is not scoped to a particular software 
component as required by NASA procedure. 
Much of this risk can be attributed to unfamiliarity with 
describing software risk in hazards and misunderstanding the 
expectations of the CSERP board.  This risk has also abated 
over time, yet remains present in some hazard reports.  
SR&QA personnel are conducting workshops with project 
safety engineers to educate them further on describing 
software risk.  We have also provided a two-page “user 
guide” with examples of how safety engineers can specify 
software causes of hazards that has been well-received by 
SR&QA personnel.  Furthermore, NASA technicians are 
considering changes to the hazard tracking system to enable 
safety engineers to mark software causes, controls and 
verifications as involving software. 
3) Risk 3 – “Lumped” software causes and controls 
impede verification.  
Many hazard reports placed all software causes and most 
software controls under a single cause labeled “Software-
based error.”  In many cases, this cause had a single control 
with multiple pages of software design and operational 
information.  This large control then had a single 
verification.  This single control, while highly detailed, 
presents risk in that software design and behaviors will not 
be individually verified.   
As with the previous risk, CSERP and SR&QA 
personnel are working closely with project safety engineers 
to “modularize” the description of software causes controls 
instead of treating software as a single black-box entity.  A 
constant challenge faced by CSERP, SR&QA and safety 
engineers is determining when differentiating complex 
hardware and software functionalities into multiple causes 
and controls is appropriate.  Complex causes and controls 
introduce risk that some individual risks may not be well 
understood.  However, creating controls also entails 
significant additional verification effort that may yield little 
return if the cause/control was largely covered elsewhere. 
4) Risk 4 – Incorrect references to hazard reports, 
causes and controls impair traceability.  
A number of references to missing or incorrect hazard 
reports, causes or controls were observed.  The most 
substantial risk is that a cause may not be adequately 
controlled when one or more of its controls are transferred to 
an incorrect or missing hazard report, cause, or control.  
NASA technicians are currently deploying improved 
functionality in the HTS to allow safety engineers to create 
explicit references to other hazards, causes, controls and 
verifications in the hazard reports.  This functionality will be 
backed by automated verification and bookkeeping. 
5) Risk 5 – Sub-controls dissuade independent 
verification and add overhead.  
Many HRs have controls that contain enumerated “sub-
controls.”  Greater confidence in the control may be gained 
by verifying the sub-controls independently.  Furthermore, 
additional risk is introduced in that references to sub-controls 
may become lost or incorrect as these references must 
necessarily be manual instead of taking advantage of the 
technology available in the hazard tracking system. As in 
Risk 3, CSERP and SR&QA personnel are working closely 
with safety engineers to determine the best methods for 
separating out and managing the overhead associated with 
complex controls.   
6) Risk 6 – Ubiquity of transferred causes and controls 
may mask software risk.  
Across the projects, 23-31% of causes and 11-22% of 
controls were transferred.  While necessary and appropriate 
in documenting hazards, transferred causes and controls 
represent added risk.  The applicability of transferred causes 
and the adequacy of transferred controls must be re-
evaluated in their original context whenever any changes are 
made to the causes or controls.  Furthermore, additional 
bookkeeping is necessary to ensure that the references to 
hazard reports, causes and controls are up to date (see Risk 
4).  Transferred causes and controls also make it difficult to 
understand the impact of software.  
Stronger tool support (as described in Risk 4) enables 
better traceability and bookkeeping, but also enables analysis 
that can be used to quantify software risk.  Coupled with 
marking causes and controls as software (as described in 
Risk 2), the HTS tool could then report comprehensively the 
number of software causes and controls by automatically 
resolving dependencies between hazards. 
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
We analyzed 154 hazard reports from the preliminary 
design phases of three flight hardware projects in the NASA 
Constellation program.  Our goals were to: 1) quantify the 
prevalence of software in hazards, causes and controls; and 
3) to evaluate software causes of hazardous conditions 
according to their specificity.  We found that 49-70% of 
hazardous conditions in the three systems could be caused by 
software or software was involved in the prevention of the 
hazardous condition.  We also found that 12-17% of the 
2013 hazard causes involved software, and that 23-29% of 
all causes had a software control.  Furthermore, 10-12% of 
all controls were software-based.   
By analyzing hazard reports, we gained insight into risk 
areas within the software safety analysis process by 
analyzing its process artifacts.  We identified six risks in 
software safety analysis reporting.  We are working with 
NASA SR&QA personnel in an ongoing effort to educate 
NASA safety engineers on describing software safety risk, to 
improve NASA process documents and training materials, 
and to provide tool support to the software safety process.  
In the future, we are planning to compare the various 
systems in an attempt to build baselines for the various 
software measures. This will allow us to interpret the data 
more effectively. For example, if the three systems are 
similar, then we might expect software to play a similar role 
in the causes and controls.  If not, how might we characterize 
the differences? Analysis of the data shows that the software 
related hazards, causes, and controls for project B are much 
lower than those for project A. Why might this be true?  The 
two systems may be sufficiently different with respect to 
their use of software, or the incompleteness of the data and 
the numerous transfers may be masking their similarities. 
A longer term goal is to evaluate multi-system, 
“integrated” hazards. It may be difficult to  consistently 
measure the software scope in hazard reports among 
subsystems because of difference in reporting software 
causes and controls (software’s role), i.e., a sufficient 
software risk assessment across the program is difficult, 
expensive, or maybe even impossible.   Finally, we plan to 
continue our evaluation to hazard reports on other NASA 
systems and extend our evaluations to include controls and 
verifications. 
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